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Abstract
In settings of incomplete information, we put forward: (1) a very conservative -
indeed, purely set-theoretic- model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones) that
each player may have about the payoff types of his opponents, and (2) a new and
robust solution concept, based on mutual belief of rationality, capable of leveraging
such conservative beliefs.
We exemplify the applicability of our new approach for single-good auctions. In
particular we show that, under our solution concept, there exists a simple normal-
form mechanism, which always sells the good, always has non-negative revenue, and
guarantees (up to an arbitrarily small, additive constant) a revenue benchmark that
is always greater than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much
greater. By contrast, we also prove that the same benchmark cannot even be approx-
imated within any positive factor, under classical solution concepts.
Thesis Supervisor: Silvio Micali
Title: Ford Professor of Engineering, EECS
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We focus on settings of incomplete information. Here, a player i knows precisely 64,
his own (payoff) type, but not 9_j, the type subprofile of his opponents. Accordingly,
he may have all kinds of beliefs (even wrong ones) about 0_j. We refer to such beliefs
as i's external beliefs, and to 64 as his internal knowledge.
For achieving a desired goal, a mechanism designer should in general consider
leveraging both the players' internal knowledge and their external beliefs. Mechanisms
working in dominant or undominated strategies leverage the former, but not the
latter.' Mechanisms using Bayesian Nash equilibrium as their underlying solution
concept leverage both, but assume that the type profile 9 is drawn from a distribution
D that is (commonly) known to the players.
Independent of any additional assumptions (e.g., assumptions about the relation-
ships among the players' individual beliefs), modeling a player i's own belief about
the actual type profile 9 as a distribution Di imposes significant constraints. It is true
that we focus on settings of incomplete information, and it is also true that modeling
uncertainty by distributions is a traditional choice. Yet, we should always be cog-
nizant that this traditional choice constitutes a strong assumption. A distribution
Di is a very structured form of incomplete information. In particular, it presupposes
that player i can precisely compare any possible pair of type profiles 0' and 9", and
'Whenever such mechanisms exist, they achieve their goals no matter what external beliefs the
players may have.
9
determine -say-- that 9' is 3.2718 times more likely than 9". Often, however, i may
not have such structured beliefs. In a single-good auction, i may value the item for
sale for 50 and believe that one of his opponents values for more than 100. Such a
belief is not a distribution: indeed, i may not know whom such a high-valuing player
might be, nor what the probabilities for his valuation being 101, 102, etc. might be.
Such belief is not leverageable by Bayesian mechanisms, but it would be nice to be
able to leverage it too, somehow.
In sum, classical mechanisms exploit two extremes, (1) the players have no external
beliefs and (2) the players' external beliefs consist of probability distributions, but
not the vast ground in between. Personally, we consider the first extreme as too
pessimistic and the second as too optimistic, and wish to explore a "middle road" to
mechanism design.
Our Contributions in a Nutshell We introduce a set-theoretic model for the
beliefs that a player may have about his opponents. Our model is very conservative.
In sharp contrast with the Bayesian setting, we do not even assume that there exist
a player i and a pair of type subprofiles for his opponents such that i can tell which
of the two subprofiles is more "likely" than the other.
As unstructured as such beliefs may be, we prove that it is possible to design
mechanisms that successfully leverage them. Indeed, for single-good auctions we (1)
define a new revenue benchmark that is always greater than or equal to the second-
highest valuation, and sometimes much higher, and (2) show that this new benchmark
can be guaranteed, by a simple mechanism, even when the designer has no information
about the players' valuations or their beliefs.
Our mechanism only assumes the players' mutual (as opposed to "common") belief
of rationality. The exact formalization of our solution concept, conservative strict
implementation, is of independent interest. Indeed, we have been able to use it for
other goals in other settings.
We also prove that our new revenue benchmark cannot even be meaningfully ap-
proximated under classical solution concepts, such as implementation in undominated
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strategies (and thus implementation in dominant strategies), or implementation in ex-
post equilibrium. These impossibility results hold even if the designer is allowed to
leverage the players' beliefs (e.g., via richer strategy spaces than those traditionally
envisaged). Indeed, they hold because of the inability of classical solution concepts
to leverage mutual belief of rationality.
Finally, we propose to enlarge the traditional definition of social choice corre-
spondences so as to allow them to depend also on the players' beliefs, and not just on
their types. This gives a mechanism designer a richer and meaningful set of "targets",
possibly enabling him to "jump over higher bars".
Finiteness While our belief model and solution concept are very general, our the-
orems focus solely on single-good auctions where all valuations are non-negative in-
tegers upperbounded by some value V, and all mechanisms provide each player with
a finite number of pure strategies.
11
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Chapter 2
Our Model
2.1 The Conservative-Belief Model
Definition 1. A conservative context C consists of a tuple (n, Q, E, u, 0, V),
where
* (n, Q, E, u, 0) is a traditional context of incomplete information,1 and
* 9 is a profile such that, for each player i, (1) i C 6 and (2) tj = 64 for all
t E _q.
We refer to 9 as the conservative belief profile, and say that -i is correct if
9 E 9j.
In a conservative context, 9i represents all possible candidates for the true type
profile in player i's view. (We do not include the players' higher-level beliefs in our
contexts because our solution concept prevents such beliefs from affecting a rational
play of our mechanism.)
Knowledge and Beliefs Components n, Q, E, and u are common knowledge
to everyone. Each player i individually knows 64 and 9j, is rational, and believes
'That is, {1, ... , n} is the set of players; Q the set of outcomes; E = 01 x - - - x 0, the set of all
possible (payoff) type profiles; u the profile of utility functions, each ui mapping E9 x Q to R, the
set of reals; and 0 E e the profile of true types. If t, E E9 and w a distribution over 92, then ui(ti, w)
is the expectation induced by w.
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that his opponents are rational. (Any unspecified knowledge and belief of players or
mechanism designers can be chosen arbitrarily.)
Important Clarifications
1. Conservative Beliefs Always Exist. The conservative-belief profile is a model
rather than an assumption. As usual, a player i knows 6i, but we make no
requirement about his external belief. For instance, he may have no external
belief whatsoever. In this case, -4 = 61 x ... x 8 -1 x {60} x E± 1 x -.. x 6E).
On the other extreme, he may have no external uncertainty whatsoever. In this
case, 9i = {t} for some type profile t (not necessarily equal to 0).2
2. Players' beliefs can be wrong. Indeed it may even be the case that 0 V 56 for
each player i.
3. Compatibility with Additional Beliefs. The profile R is compatible with the
players having additional beliefs, even of a probabilistic nature, such as partial
distributions. For example, a player i may believe that the probability of another
player j's valuation being 100 is between 1/3 and 2/3. In no case, however, can
these additional beliefs contradict -q. For instance, if a player i believes that
the true type profile has been drawn from some distribution D, then M, should
coincide with D's support.
Let us stress that our mechanisms leverage 9 in order to achieve their goals,
but work no matter what additional beliefs (compatible with 9) the players
might have.
4. External Beliefs and Payoff Types. Relative to -, the external belief of a player
i, &, is formally defined to be the set {ti : (O, t-j) E qi}. As a player i's type
is a comprehensive description of i in the strategic situation at hand, we are
essentially separating i's payoff type, O6, from his external-belief type, 4.
2If the context were one of complete information, then necessarily -i = {} for all i.
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Conservative Single-Good Auction Contexts A conservative single-good auc-
tion context is a conservative context (n, Q, e, u, 0, 9) where: e = {0, 1, ... , V}" for
some positive integer V referred to as the valuation bound; Q = {0, 1,... , n} x R";3
and each utility function ui is so defined: ui(ti, (a, P)) equals t1 - P if i = a, and -P
otherwise.
If w = (a, P) E Q, then player i's utility for w, ui(w), is ui(0j, w); and the revenue
of W, REV(w), is EZ P. We denote by 'r the set of all conservative single-good
auction contexts with n players and valuation bound V, and by 92' the set of all
contexts in <, where the conservative belief of every player is correct.
Remarks
" Working solely in our model, we may drop the term "conservative" or use it for
emphasis/clarity only. Further, since all auctions we consider are single-good, we
may also omit the term "single-good."
" An auction context C is identified by n, V, 9 and 9 alone: that is, C =
(n, V, , q).
" In an auction context, a player i's true type 64 -also called i's true valuation-
represents i's value for the good for sale, and i's conservative belief qj is a set of
non-negative integer profiles.
" In the discussion below, given an underlying context, 9 always represents the
true type profile, while a type profile t can be an arbitrary element in a player's
conservative belief 9j.
2.2 Conservative-Belief Social Choice Correspon-
dences and Their Advantages
Traditionally, social choice correspondences map type profiles to sets of (distributions
over) outcomes, but can be naturally extended to map conservative-belief profiles to
31n an outcome (a, P), a denotes the player getting the good if > 0, or that the good is unallocated
if = 0; and P denotes the price profile.
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sets of outcomes. This extension strictly enriches the set of "targets" for mechanism
design. As noted, each context C implicitly has a conservative-belief profile 9, from
which the true type profile 0 could be easily computed. Thus, for each traditional
correspondence f there exists an extended correspondence F such that f(6) = F(9),
but not vice versa.
The advantage of a meaningful and enlarged "target space" is pretty clear. Very
often we do not know how to design mechanisms implementing a given, traditional,
social choice correspondence f. Sometimes we can actually prove that designing
such mechanisms is impossible (at least for some type of implementation -e.g., in
dominant strategies). In these cases, while one can always shop around for new,
meaningful, and achievable targets among traditional social choice correspondences,
extended social choice correspondences provide access to additional targets, which are
more tractable, reasonable, but not expressible in terms of 0 alone. For instance, in [8]
we prove the existence of a very robust mechanism that, in any truly combinatorial
auction and without any knowledge about the players' true valuations, generates
within a factor of 2 the "maximum revenue that a player could guarantee if he were
charged to sell the goods to his competitors by means of take-it-or-leave-it offers."
In this thesis, instead of using conservative beliefs for achieving a social choice
correspondence "tamer" than classical ones, we use them for (introducing and then)
achieving a "tougher" one.
2.3 The Second-Belief Revenue Benchmark
In auction contexts, a revenue benchmark F is a function mapping each conservative
belief profile 9 to a real number. Thus, de facto, F is a social choice correspondence:
the one mapping each q to the set of outcomes whose revenue is at least F(9). 4 Let
us now define a revenue benchmark for single-good auctions.
4Notice that we are slightly overloading the notation F here and in the previous subsection. When
talking about a generic context F is a social-choice correspondence and F(-4) is a set of outcomes,
and when talking about generating revenue in single-good auctions F is a revenue benchmark and
F(9) is a real number. Such overloading will not cause any ambiguity since in our discussion it is
always clear whether we are talking about a general context or single-good auctions.
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Definition 2. The second-belief benchmark, denoted by 2 "d, is the revenue bench-
mark so defined. Relative to given a belief profile 4, for every player i let the sure
maximum price according to the belief of i be smpi =^ mintEA maxj tj. Then, 2 "d( 4 )
is the second highest value in {smp1,... , smpn}.
If t were the true valuation profile, then maxj tj would be the maximum price that
a player is willing to pay for the good. Thus, relative to 9j, smpi is the maximum
price for which player i is sure that some player (possibly i or a player whose identity
is not precisely known to i) is willing to pay for the good.
A Simple Example Consider an auction with three players where 0 = (100, 80,60)
and
91 = {(100,x,y) : x > Oy 0},
92 = {(100, 80, x), (y, 80, 100) : x > 0, y 2 0}, and
23 = {(150, 0,60)}.
Here, the beliefs of players 1 and 2 are correct, but that of player 3 is wrong. Player 1
has no external beliefs: in his eyes, all valuations are possible for his two opponents.
Player 2 believes that either player 1 or player 3 has valuation 100, but cannot tell
whom. Player 3 has no external uncertainty: in his eyes, (150,0,60) is the true
valuation profile. According to 9, smp1 = smp2 = 100, smp3 = 150, and thus
2 nd(q) = 100, which in this specific case happens to be the highest valuation.
Remark Sometimes 2 nd(g) can exceed the highest valuation, but never when all
beliefs are correct. However, since smpi O for every player i, it is always the
case that "2d() 2 nd()": that is, our benchmark is always greater than or equal
to the second highest true valuation. Accordingly, a mechanism designer concerned
with generating revenue should try to achieve the second-belief benchmark instead
of using the second-price mechanism to generate revenue equal to the second-highest
valuation. If he succeeds, the seller may have something (possibly a lot) to gain and
nothing to lose.
17
As we prove, however, this more demanding benchmark cannot be achieved via
classical solution concepts.
18
Chapter 3
Statement and Discussion of Our
Results
3.1 The Impossibility of Classically Implementing
the Second-Belief Benchmark
Recall that a mechanism M provides each player i with a set of pure strategies,
consistently denoted by Si in this thesis, and maps each strategy profile o- to an
outcome (or a distribution over outcomes, if M is probabilistic or c- a mixed-strategy
profile) denoted by M(o-). Also recall that a mechanism is finite if each Si is finite,
and that a game G consists of a context C and a mechanism M: G = (C, M). Finally,
when the mechanism M is clear, for any strategy profile -, we may denote ui(M(o-))
by ui(o-) for short.
For our impossibility results, we consider mechanisms that allow the players to
"stay home", that is, to opt out of the auction. Otherwise, one could trivially and
meaninglessly generate high revenue by forcing the players to participate in an auction
mechanism always giving them very negative utility.
Definition 3. A mechanism M is reasonable if it is finite and satisfies the following
opt-out condition: V player i 3outi E Si such that for (any possible true type 9i
and) any strategy subprofile s-i E Sj, ui(M(outi, si)) = 0.
19
Remarks
" Having the opt-out condition requiring i's utility to be 0 in expectation, rather
than for every outcome in the support of M(outi, s-i), can only make our im-
possibility results stronger.
* Our impossibility results already hold for auctions with just two players, and
when all beliefs are correct. Actually, when the players' beliefs are not correct
these results become trivial.1 Accordingly, we state our impossibility results in
terms of _9Y instead of 7e.
* In our impossibility results we never assume any restrictions on the strategy
spaces. In particular, our results also apply to normal-form mechanisms that
let the players report their (alleged) conservative beliefs, as it is fair to do so
when trying to leverage them.
3.1.1 Impossibility of Implementation in Undominated Strate-
gies
Implementation in undominated strategies is a classical notion for settings of incom-
plete information.2 We strengthen our first impossibility result by adopting a weaker
notion of such implementation.3 Notice that this weaker notion is already sufficient
from a mechanism designer's point of view.
'This is so because, when more than one player's beliefs are not correct, it is trivial to construct
contexts for which the second-belief benchmark is much greater than the highest valuation. And no
classical notion of implementation can guarantee revenue greater than the highest valuation.
2 Given a game G = (C, M), a strategy si of player i is weakly dominated by another (possibly
mixed) strategy ui if ui(o-, s-i) ;> ui(si, s-i) for every strategy subprofile s-i of the others, and
ui(o-, s'_) > ui(si, s'_) for some strategy subprofile s'_i. A strategy si is undominated if it is not
weakly dominated by any strategy. A strategy si is purely undominated if it is not weakly dominated
by any pure strategy. Thus, to compute his own undominated strategies in a game, a player needs
not have any information about his opponents' (payoff) types.
3 Note that the traditional notion of (full) implementation in undominated strategies -see Jackson
[20]- requires not only that every profile of undominated strategies yields an outcome satisfying the
desired social choice correspondence, but also that, conversely, for each desired outcome there exists
a profile of undominated strategies yielding that outcome. By removing the latter requirement we
weaken the notion of implementation and thus strengthen the impossibility result of Theorem 1.
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Definition 4. A mechanism M sufficiently implements a revenue benchmark F
for a class W of auction contexts in undominated strategies if, V contexts C E W and
V profiles s of undominated strategies in the game (C, M), denoting by 9 the belief
profile of C, we have that
REV(M(s)) > F(Q).
Theorem 1. Ve E (1/2, 1] and V V > []1/1, no reasonable mechanism sufficiently
implements E2 nd for 92V in undominated strategies.
For deterministic mechanisms and purely undominated strategies, our impossibil-
ity result holds for arbitrary approximation factors.
Theorem 2. Ve E (0, 1] and V V > [1/El, no reasonable deterministic mechanism
sufficiently implements E2 nd for -92 in purely undominated strategies.
We prove Theorem 1 in Chapter 5. The proof of Theorem 2 is similar (and
simpler), and thus omitted.
3.1.2 Impossibility of Implementation in Dominant Strate-
gies
Theorems 1 and 2 immediately yield the following about strictly/weakly/very weakly
dominant strategies. 4
Corollary 1. Ve E (1/2, 1] and V V > [E_/], no reasonable mechanism implements
c2nd for 92V in strictly/weakly dominant strategies or in (all) very weakly dominant
strategies.
Corollary 2. Ve E (0, 1] and V V > [1/E], no reasonable deterministic mechanism
implements e2nd for 92V in strictly/weakly dominant strategies or in (all) very weakly
dominant strategies.
4A strategy si of player i is strictly dominant if for every other strategy s', ui(si, si) > us(s', sj)
for every strategy subprofile s_. Strategy si is weakly dominant if for every other strategy s',
u2(si, s-i) > ui(s', s-i) for every s-i, and the inequality is strict for some s-i. Strategy si is very
weakly dominant if for every other strategy s', ui(si, sj) 2 uj(s', sj) for every s-i.
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3.1.3 A Crucial Clarification
Note that, in the absence of Theorems 1 and 2, the above two corollaries would be
trivial if the players were restricted to bid valuations only. In such a case, in fact,
the second-price mechanism is "the only" (weakly) dominant-strategy mechanism
for auctions of a single good. And since the revenue it generates is precisely equal
to the second-highest valuation, no other dominant-strategy mechanism can generate
second-belief revenue. "QED." We thus wish to emphasize again that all our impossi-
bility results hold without any restrictions on strategy spaces, and in particular that a
mechanism asking the players to announce conservative beliefs cannot be "simulated"
by one asking them to announce only valuations.
By allowing arbitrary strategy spaces, we explicitly allow the designer to leverage
each player's external beliefs. However, as Theorems 1 and 2 show, when the designer
does not leverage the players' mutual belief of rationality, he cannot hope to even
approximate our benchmark.
3.1.4 Extra Fragility of Implementation at Some Ex-Post/Very
Weakly Dominant Equilibria
A mechanism guaranteeing a given property at some equilibria of a given type is
certainly more fragile than one guaranteeing it at all equilibria of that type. Indeed,
one has no control over the equilibrium ultimately selected by the players. But
mechanisms implementing E2"d at some ex-post or very weakly dominant equilibria
have some extra fragility. Consider the following mechanism for W2100.
Mechanism NAIVE. A strategy of player i has two components: an integer a,
and a set bi _ {0, 1, ... ,100}. (Allegedly, ai is player i's true valuation, and
bi his true external belief.) The winner and prices are decided as follows. Let
w = argmaxj ai (ties broken lexicographically), and let P = mintE'_ maxj t
where q'__ = {a_,} x b-,. If a, ;> P, then the good is sold to player w, w
pays P, and his opponent pays 0. Else, the good is unsold and both players pay
0.
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According to NAIVE, it is clear that every player announcing his true valuation
and true external belief in every context is an ex-post equilibrium. When the play-
ers' beliefs are correct, this equilibrium guarantees second-belief revenue. However,
consider the context C where
0 = (70, 100), _1 = {(70, x) : x > 90}, and -2 = {(x, 100) : x > 60}.
In this context, all beliefs are correct, 2 nd(M) = 90, the truthful ex-post equilibrium
yields the strategy profile ((70, {x : x > 90}), (100, {x : x > 60})), and it generates
revenue 90 as desired. However, it is also clear that ((70, {x : x > 0}), (100, {x :
x > 60})) is an alternative Nash equilibrium -corresponding to another ex-post
equilibrium- whose revenue is only 70.
In principle -e.g., when two Nash equilibria differ at multiple players, one can
argue that a player may be able to establish some belief about which equilibrium
is going to be played out by the others, and best respond to his belief. But in the
above example, the "truthful" and the "alternative" equilibria differ only at player l's
strategy. Thus, even if player 1 believed that player 2 will play his truthful strategy,
it would also be perfectly rational for player 1 to play his own alternative strategy.
Viceversa, even if player 2 believed that player 1 will play his alternative strategy,
it would also be perfectly rational for player 2 to stick to his own truthful strategy
(which coincides with his alternative one in the above example).
Accordingly, which revenue should we expect from NAIVE for context C? The
answer is 90 if player 1 is "generous" towards the seller and 70 otherwise.5 In Ap-
pendix A, we formalize this phenomenon and prove, in Theorems 4 and 5, that such
extra fragility is actually unavoidable for any mechanism implementing (or even ap-
proximating) the second-belief benchmark at some ex-post or very weakly dominant
equilibria.
5Notice that the truthful ex-post equilibrium actually specifies a very weakly dominant strategy
for each player in each context, and thus illustrates the lack of robustness for implementation at
some very weakly dominant equilibria as well. Such lack of robustness was already pointed out by
Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato theoretically [24] and by Casona, Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato exper-
imentally [6]. In [24] the authors also propose secure implementation: essentially, implementation
via mechanisms ensuring that (a) each player has a very weakly dominant strategy, and that (b) the
desired property holds at all Nash equilibria (and thus all very weakly dominant ones). As we have
discussed, therefore, the second-belief revenue benchmark is not securely implementable.
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Clarification Although very weakly dominant equilibrium and ex-post equilibrium
are very related notions, and sometimes one implies the other, there are games where
they are not the same. Accordingly, our fragility theorems are explicitly stated for
both.
3.2 Our New Solution Concept
The inability of achieving the second-belief benchmark via classical notions of im-
plementation encourages us to develop a new one. Intuitively, but erroneously, our
notion can be taken to consist of "two-round elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies" (hardly a new solution concept!). The problem is that such elimination is not
well defined in a setting of incomplete information: without knowing his opponents'
payoff types, a player is not capable of figuring out what strategies are left for them
after the first round, and thus is not capable of figuring out which of his own strategies
are dominated in the second round. Therefore we must be more careful.
Sketch of Our Notion Our notion is formally defined in Section 6.1, but can be
summarized as follows.
We say that a normal-form mechanism M conservatively strictly implements a
social choice correspondence F for a class of contexts W if, for any context C E 7
denoting by 9 the belief profile of C, we have M(s) E F(9) for any strategy profile
s surviving the following two-step elimination procedure:
1. Each player eliminates all of his strictly dominated strategies;
2. Based on his conservative belief 9, and assuming that everyone completes
Step 1, each player i eliminates all his remaining strategies that are dominated
relative to 9j.
The real novelty of our notion, and the key for meaningfully leveraging set-theoretic
beliefs, lie with properly defining "domination relative to Mi" in Step 2. As usual,
after Step 1, to determine which of his remaining strategies are dominated, i should
24
know what are the currently surviving strategies of the other players. However, to
figure this out, player i must also know what are the true types of the other players
-which is precisely a piece of information that he does not have in a setting of
incomplete information. We address this concern by breaking down Step 2 into two
conceptual sub-steps as follows.
2.1 Each player i, for each type profile t in 4, computes the profile S(t), where
each S(t)j represents the set of surviving strategies for player j after Step 1, if
t were the true type profile.
2.2 Each player i eliminates a Step-1 surviving strategy si if and only if there exists
another (possibly mixed) Step-1 surviving strategy a- that (classically) strictly
dominates si with respect to S(t) for each t E 2q.
Remark Let us emphasize a subtle point hidden in Step 2.2. Consider the following
two ways of defining si to be "dominated relative to 9j":
(i) for each t E 9j, si is strictly dominated with respect to S(t) by some o-j, and
(ii) for each t E .4, si is strictly dominated with respect to S(t) by the same o-i.
Although both ways are based on the players' set-theoretic beliefs q, we have adopted
the latter one. The reason is that, when he eliminates a strategy si dominated
according to (ii), player i is sure to have a better strategy to play, namely o-, no
matter which type profile in 4 might be the right one. But the same is not true
when he eliminates a strategy dominated according to (i).
Example6 Consider a mechanism M played by two players, where the true type
profile is 0 = (01,02), and the belief of player 1 is 1 = {(01,92), (01,90)}. (Since
we are going to analyze only player l's behavior, we do not need to specify 92 nor
the other possible type profiles.) The mechanism gives player 1 the pure strategies a,
b, and c, and player 2 the pure strategies d and e. For each type profile in 21, the
players' utilities under M are as follows.
6We thank Paul Valiant for this example.
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(01,02) (01, 0')
1 2 d 
e
a 2,0 2,1
b -100,0 3,1
c 3,0 -100,1
d e
a 2,1 2,0
b -100,1 3,0
c 3,1 -100,0
Notice that, in Step 1 of our notion, player 1 cannot eliminate any strategy. Player
2 instead would eliminate d (strictly dominated by e) if his true type were 92, and e
(strictly dominated by d) if his true type were 6'. Let us now consider Step 2. If we
adopted definition (i) in Step 2.2, then player 1 should eliminate strategy a, because
it is strictly dominated by b with respect to his candidate type profile (01,92), and by
c with respect to his other candidate type profile (01, 0'). However, whether player 1
should play b or c in place of a really depends on whether (01, 02) or (01, 0') is the true
type profile. If he makes the wrong choice, then his loss is huge compared with his
possible gain: namely, -100 versus 3. Without any "likelihood" associated with each
candidate type profile in his belief 21, it might be reasonable and safer for player 1
to use a to always get utility 2. (Thus, if M banked on player 1 not choosing a in
order to implement its desired social choice correspondence, it may not implement it
in a robust sense.)
Mutual Belief of Rationality Implementation in dominant or undominated strate-
gies only requires that every player is rational. Conservative strict implementation
instead additionally requires that every player believes that his opponents are ra-
tional. However, it does not require "higher-level" beliefs of rationality, let alone
common belief. That is,
Conservative strict implementation solely relies on rationality and mutual belief
of rationality.
In essence, our notion is only "slightly" weaker than implementation in strictly
dominant strategies, yet is defined carefully to explicitly leverage the players' beliefs
about others in a robust way.
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3.3 The Second-Belief Benchmark is Conservatively
Strictly Implementable
Finally, we prove that conservative strict implementation succeeds where classical
notions fail. Namely, under our solution concept, we exhibit a mechanism M, the
second-belief mechanism, that guarantees second-belief revenue, within an arbitrar-
ily small additive value E, in all single-good auction contexts. Our mechanism is
uniformly specified for all values e, numbers of players n, and valuation bounds V:
M = ME,,,v. Formally,
Theorem 3. For any E E (0,1], n, and V, Me,nv conservatively strictly implements
2 nd - e for <'.
The second-belief mechanism is defined in Section 6.2 and analyzed in Section 6.3.
In Chapter 7 we address three concerns raised about our mechanism.
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Chapter 4
Related Work
In Bayesian settings with a common prior, higher revenue benchmarks can be guar-
anteed, and, more generally, more social choice functions can be implemented, under
proper assumptions.1 These works are not very relevant to ours, since we focus on a
non-probabilistic model of incomplete information, and we do not impose any common
knowledge assumption about the players' beliefs. Let us instead recall other works,
where probabilistic/common-prior assumptions have been substantially relaxed.
Other Models of Incomplete Information Postlewaite and Schmeidler [23]
studied differential information settings for exchange economies. They model a
player's uncertainty as a partition of the set of all possible states of the world, and as-
sume such partitions to be common knowledge. In our case, we do not assume a player
to have any knowledge/beliefs about the knowledge/beliefs of another player, and we
certainly do not have any common-knowledge requirements. In addition, they further
assume that each player has a probabilistic distribution over the state space, and use
Bayesian equilibrium as the key solution concept. Their model actually reduces to
Harsanyi's incomplete information model [17] if the state space is finite.
Chung and Ely [11] model a player's belief about the state of the world via a
'For instance, Cremer and McLean [12] show that, for ceratin valuation distributions, revenue
equal to the highest valuation can be achieved in a single-good auction under Bayesian Nash equi-
librium or in weakly dominant strategies. Also, Abreu and Matsushima [2] show that, under some
technical conditions, any Bayesian incentive compatible social-choice function can be virtually im-
plemented in iteratively undominated strategies.
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distribution, but assume that he prefers one outcome w to another w' if he locally
prefers w to w' in every state that is possible according to his belief. In this sense,
what matters is the support of the distribution, which is set-theoretic. The authors
show that, even when the players only have very small uncertainty about the state of
the world, the set of social choice rules implementable at (essentially) undominated
Nash equilibria is highly constrained compared with that in complete-information
settings. Their result is less relevant for settings, like ours, where a player has no
uncertainty about his own payoff type. In addition, in our purely set-theoretic model,
we have no requirement on how big a player's uncertainty about his opponents can
be. Finally, instead of studying implementation at all equilibria (of a given type), we
study the fragility of implementation even at some of them.
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano [3] also model the players' beliefs about each
other via distributions. But they assume that each player i's belief about the others'
payoff types is from a subset Qt of the set of all possible distributions, and that the
Qj's are common knowledge among the players. By doing so, they assume that the
players have some knowledge about each other's first-order belief. They impose no
constraint on the players' higher-order beliefs, and assume that no other player knows
player i's true first-order belief. Their model is still different from ours. First of all, in
our model a player's belief is set-theoretic instead of probabilistic. Second of all, we
do not assume that the players have any knowledge about each other. Moreover, their
model implicitly assumes that the players' knowledge about each other's first-order
belief is correct -i.e., player i's true first-order belief is from Qj, while in our model
a player can have arbitrary, perhaps totally wrong, beliefs about others. Finally, the
social-choice functions studied in [3] are still defined over the players' payoff types
rather than their beliefs.
Our model of external information is also related to other notions in decision
theory. In particular, Knight [21] and later Bewley [5] have considered players who
have very incomplete information about their own type. Specifically, a Knightian
player i does not know his own type 6j, nor the distribution Di from which 62 has
been drawn. Rather, he knows several distributions, one of which is guaranteed to
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be Di. Recently Knightian players have also been studied in mechanism design, in
particular, by Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon [22] for games with a single player, and
by Chiesa, Micali, and Zhu [10] for auctions with multiple players.
Also, Hyafil and Boutilier [19] study regret-minimizing equilibria in games with
multiple players having set-theoretic beliefs about each other. But they assume that
the players' beliefs come from a common prior, and are always correct. Our model
does not make these assumptions.
Impossibility Results Several impossibility results have been proved for imple-
mentation in dominant strategies: for instance, for many forms of elections (see Gib-
bard [13] and Sattherwaite [25]), for maximizing social welfare in a budget-balanced
way (see Green and Laffont [16] and Hurwicz [18]), and for maximizing revenue in
general settings of quasi-linear utilities (see Chen, Hassidim and Micali [7]). As for
mechanisms working in undominated strategies, Jackson [20] shows that the set of
social choice correspondences (fully) implementable by bounded mechanisms (which
include finite ones) is quite constrained. We note, however, that none of these re-
sults imply ours for implementing the second-belief benchmark in either dominant or
undominated strategies (indeed, our results do not require full implementation).
Prior-Free Mechanisms Prior-free mechanisms for auctions have also been inves-
tigated -in particular, by Baliga and Vohra [4], Segal [26], and Goldberg, Hartline,
Karlin, Saks, and Wright [15], although the first two of them do not consider auc-
tions of a single good. The term "prior-free" seems to suggest that this approach be
relevant to our set-theoretic setting, but things are quite different. For instance, all
cited prior-free mechanisms work in dominant strategies, and we have proved that no
dominant-strategy mechanism can even approximate our revenue benchmark. More
generally, as for all mechanisms, prior-free ones must be analyzed based on some un-
derlying solution concept, and as long as they use one of the solution concepts we
prove inadequate for our benchmark, they would automatically fail to guarantee it.
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Our Own Prior Work In [8] we studied mechanisms leveraging only (what we
now call) external correct beliefs, and, as already mentioned, constructed one such
mechanism for truly combinatorial auctions. (This mechanism would also work with
incorrect external beliefs, but under a slightly different analysis.) In a later work with
Valiant [9], we were able to extend our combinatorial-auction mechanism so as to
leverage also, to a moderate extent, the internal knowledge of the players.2 In neither
of these two papers we proved any impossibility results: given that no significant
revenue guarantees were known for combinatorial auctions, we were satisfied with
achieving new, reasonable benchmarks. Perhaps interestingly, our prior mechanisms
were of extensive form, and we still do not know whether equivalent, normal-form
ones exist.
2 The emphasis of [9] actually was the possibility of leveraging the internal knowledge of coalitions
rather than individual ones.
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Chapter 5
Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Ve E (1/2, 1] and V V > [)-/2], no reasonable mechanism sufficiently
implements E2"d for 9g' in undominated strategies.
Proof. For sake of contradiction, assume that there exist a value e E (1/2, 1], an
integer V > [e1/21, and a reasonable (probabilistic) mechanism M that sufficiently
implements E2nd for 92V in undominated strategies. To derive the desired contradic-
tion, letting H be an integer such that
1
V > H > 112
-- - 1/2'
we construct two games, G and G', as follows.
1. G = (C, M), where C = (2, V, 0, 2) with 0 = (H, 0) and 21 = _q2 = {(H, 0)}.
Note: C E -92 because all beliefs are correct, and 2 nd(q) = H because smpi =
smp 2 = H.
2. G' = (C', M), where C' = (2, V, 9', 9') with 9' = (1, 0) and M' = 2= {(1, 0)}.
Note: C' E 92V and 2 nd( ') = 1.
After analyzing the (auxiliary) game G', we derive our desired contradiction for G.
To clarify the game to which a given quantity refers, we shall use the superscripts G
and G'.
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Let UDG' - UDG' x UDI', where each UD?' is player i's set of undominated
strategies in G'. Then, by hypothesis:
Vs' E UDG', REV(M(s')) E2 (g') = E. (5.1)
Denoting as usual by A(A) the set of probabilistic distributions over a set A, we
now prove the following statement:
B a strategy o' E A(UDi') such that V strategy S2 of player 2, u U'(M(o', S2)) > 0.
(5.2)
Because M satisfies the opt-out condition, player 1 has a strategy outi such that
U1'(M(outi, 82)) = 0 Vs 2. If outi E UD1' then Statement 1 follows by taking o' =
outi. Otherwise, by the finiteness of M there exists o-' E A(UDG') such that outi is
weakly dominated by o', which implies u?'(M(o-', S2)) u?' (M(outi, S2)) = 0 Vs 2 ,
as desired.
Similarly, we have the following statement:
B a strategy or E A(UD ') such that V strategy si of player 1, uG'(M(s1 , o)) > 0.
(5.3)
Combining Statements 5.2 and 5.3, letting w' be the (possibly probabilistic) outcome
M(o-', o'), and letting p' and EPj' respectively be the probability that player i gets
the good and the expected price that i pays according to w', we have that
u 1 (w') = p' - EPj > 0 and uG'(w') = -EP2 > 0. (5.4)
Because of Equation 5.1, and because o E A(UD9') for each i, we have
REV(w') = EPJ' + EP2 > e. (5.5)
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Combining Equations 5.4 and 5.5, we have
pi / EP 2 E - EP 2 >e. (5.6)
Let us now analyze game G. Notice that, under the strategy profile (0", as), the
(possibly probabilistic) outcome of M is still w' in game G. Accordingly, following
Equation 5.6 we have that
u (M(U', a,)) = uG(w') = p'H - EPj p'H - p' 2 E(H - 1),
where the second inequality holds further because H > 1.
Let UDG = UDG x UDG, where each UD9 is player 's set of undominated
strategies in G. We now argue that there exists a strategy &i E A(UD?) such that
uG(M(&1 , o)) E(H - 1). (5.7)
To see why Inequality 5.7 is true, notice that if o,' E A(UDG) then we can take &i =
o". Otherwise, for each strategy s' which is in the support of u' but not in UD1, there
exists u" E A (UDG) weakly dominating s' in game G (again because M is finite).
Thus, we can construct &1 from a' by replacing each such s' with the corresponding
o', and the so constructed &I satisfies uf(M(&1 , a!)) uG(M(o,, o)) c(H - 1),
as desired.
Because 02 = 60, we have that player 2's set of undominated strategies is the same
in G and G', and so is his utility for each possible outcome. That is,
UDG = UDG' and uG(.) = UG'(.). (5.8)
Equations 5.3 and 5.8 directly imply the following statement:
e( e A(UDG) and uG(M(&1, u2)) > 0. (5.9)
Let w = M(& 1 , o), and let pi and EP respectively be the probability that player i
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gets the good and the expected price that i pays according to w. Following Equation
5.7 and the inequality of Statement 5.9, we have
uG(w) = p1 H - EP 1  E(H - 1) and uG(W) = -EP 2 2 0. (5.10)
Combining Equation 5.10 with the facts that 0 < pi 1, 1/2 < c < 1, and H> _1/2>
we have
REV(w) = EP 1 + EP 2  EP1 < p1H -E(H -1)= H(p1 -+-) E H(1-e+-)H H
< H(1-E+E-1/2)=H/2<EH.
Accordingly, there exists a strategy profile 9 such that: (1) si is in the support of
&1 and 92 is in the support of o, which imply that 9 E UDG; and (2) REV(M(s)) 5
REV(w) < EH = e2 "d(g). That is, we have finally reached the desired contradiction
against the hypothesis that M sufficiently implements E2"d for 92V in undominated
strategies. Thus Theorem 1 holds. M
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Chapter 6
Conservative Strict
Implementation, The Second-Belief
Mechanism, and The Analysis of
The Mechanism
6.1 Conservative Strict Implementation
The following two auxiliary definitions envisage a game with context C = (n, , 6, u, 9, q)
and mechanism M (whose strategy-profile set is denoted by S as usual).
Definition 5. Let i be a player, t, a type of i, and T = T1 x --- x T" a set of pure
strategy profiles. Then,
e We say that a strategy si E T is strictly ti-T-dominated by another strat-
egy o-1 E A(T), in symbols si <T o-, if for all strategy subprofiles s-i E T_e,
ui(ti, M(si, S-0)) < ui(ti, M(O-4, s_j)).
o We denote by S(ti) the set of pure strategies of i that are not strictly ti-S-
dominated, and, for any type profile t, we set S(t) = S(t1 ) x ... x S(tn) and
S(t-i) = S(ti) x ... x S(ti_1) x S(tai+) x -- - x S(t").
37
Accordingly, si is strictly dominated by o-i in the traditional sense if si <' a, and
S(ti) represents the strategies of i that would survive elimination of strictly dominated
strategies (in the traditional sense) if his true type were ti. Also note that, for any
t E .Vi, S(ti) = S(02), because ti = 02, while S(tj) and S(65) may be very different
for j 4 i. Thus, in general S(t) 4 S(0) for t / 0.
Definition 6. A strategy si E S(92 ) is conservatively strictly dominated if there
exists another strategy o-i E A(S(62 )) that strictly 0i-S(t)-dominates si for all t E 2R.
Else, si is conservatively strictly rational.
We are now ready to formalize our notion of implementation.
Definition 7. We say that a mechanism M conservatively strictly implements
a social choice correspondence F for a class of contexts W if, for all contexts C E W
and for all profiles s of conservatively strictly rational strategies in (C, M), denoting
by - the belief profile of C, we have that M(s) E F(9).
6.2 The Second-Belief Mechanism
For any e E (0, 1], n, and V, the mechanism ME,,,v is described below. Note that the
mechanism applies to any context in i', and is of normal form because the players
act simultaneously and only once: in Step 1. Steps a through e are just "conceptual
steps taken by the mechanism". The expression "X := x" denotes the operation that
sets or resets variable X to value x.
Mechanism ME,,,v
a: Set a := 0, and P := 0 for all players i.
Comment. Upon termination, after all proper resettings, (a, P) will be the final
outcome.
1: Each player i, publicly and simultaneously with the others, announces a pair
(e, vi) E f{0, 1} x {0, ... , V}.
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Comment. Allegedly, vi = smpi, and ej indicates whether i's announcement is
about his internal knowledge (allegedly ej = 0 signifies that vi = 0j), or about
his external belief.
b: If vi = 0 for each i, then reset a to be a randomly chosen player, and halt.
c: Order the announced n pairs according to v1 , ... , v,., decreasingly, breaking ties
in favor of those with ej = 0. If there are still ties among some pairs, then break
them according to the corresponding players.
Comment. It does not matter whether the players are ordered lexicographically
(increasingly or decreasingly), or according to some other way.
d: Set a to be the player corresponding to the first pair, and Pa max{ j, maxjoa Vj}
e: For each player i, Pi := P - J, where 6= [ -g + (J47-{.
Comment. Each player i receives a reward 6i.
Remark
" Notice that ME,,,v always sells the good.
" Non-negative Revenue. Notice that if M,,,y halts in Step b then its revenue is
0. Otherwise, its revenue equals the price charged to player a in Step d minus
the total rewards given to the players in Step e. Because for each player i the
reward that i receives in Step e is oi < (1) = - < -, the total rewards
given to the players in Step e is at most . Because the price charged to player
a in Step d is at least j, we have that ME,,,v always has non-negative revenue.
* Uniform Construction. As promised, it is clear that ME,,,v is uniformly and
efficiently constructible on inputs c, n, and V. In addition, it is very simple.
It essentially consists of the second-price mechanism together with carefully
designed rewards. In light of our impossibility results about implementing E2nd
under classical solution concepts, this simplicity suggests that conservative strict
implementation can be quite powerful.
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* From Additive to Multiplicative E. Notice that the reward each player gets
in Step e is at most -. Thus if a player does not get the good, then his
utility is at most n. This is so because we aim at achieving the second belief
revenue benchmark up to only an additive e. If we are willing to give up an
E fraction of the revenue benchmark, then each player could receive a reward
proportional to the second highest bid in the mechanism, so that his utility may
still be very high even if he does not get the good. For instance, we can use
= E maxjga Vi _vi_ 1-eiji 4n I1+Vi +(1+V)2-
6.3 Analysis of The Second-Belief Mechanism
Theorem 3. For any e E (0, 1], n, and V, ME,nv conservatively strictly implements
2 nd - E for 'er.
Proof. Arbitrarily fix E E (0, 1], n, V, C = (n, V, 0, 9) E Wj, and a strategy profile s.
Denoting Meny by M for short, it suffices for us to prove that, if s is conservatively
strictly rational in the game (C, M), then
REV(M(s)) 2d(_) - e. (6.1)
Letting si 4 (el, vi) for each i, we start by proving three claims.
CLAIM 1. V player i and V type tj E {0, ... , V} of i, if si E S(ti) then vi > ti.
PROOF OF CLAIM 1. Assume for sake of contradiction that si E S(ti) and vi < ti.
We shall show that si is strictly ti-S-dominated by s' = (0, ti). By definition, this
implies si 0 S(ti), a contradiction. For this purpose, letting s'_i be an arbitrary
strategy subprofile of -i, it suffices to show that
Ui (ti, (si, s'_ )) < ui (ti, (s'" s'g)).
To do so, let s' = (e', vj) for each j / i. Moreover, in the plays of (si, s'_j) and (s', s')
respectively, let (a, P) and (a', P') be the outcomes, and 6% and 6i the rewards that
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player i receives in Step e.
Because vi 2 0 by the construction of M and vi < tj by hypothesis, we have
that t > 1 and M does not halt in Step b in the play of (s', s'_J. Below we shall
distinguish two exhaustive cases, according to the play of (si, s').
Case 1. M halts in Step b in the play of (si, s').
In this case, by the construction of M we have vi = 0, v = 0 for each ji,
and
t-
Ui(ti, (si, s'_ )) = n.
Now we consider the play of (s', s'). Because tj > 1 > 0 = maxgi v , we have
a' =i,
P = maxf., maxjgi vj} - f = 1 - 6', and of = t + (1
ingly,
1
2
> 0. Accord-
1 t-
> ti- >-
2 -n
where the second inequality holds because t2 > 1 and n > 2.
ui(ti, (si, s'_)) < ui(ti, (s', s')) as desired.
Case 2. M does not halt in Step b in the play of (si, s'_J.
In this case, by the construction of M we have
Therefore
C ~ vi 1 - ei]j; = --- + V)4n .11+ vi (1 IV2
and 6J' = '-[ t v + i .
*4n _1+ tj (1 + V)2
Accordingly,
, 6i
E
+ 4
1 - (1 - ei)
(1+ V) 2
= - + > 0
4n (1 + ti) (1 + vi) (1 + V)2 I
where the inequality holds because vi < tj by hypothesis and ej > 0 by the
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6 t 
o i ]4n .1 + tj 1 + vi.
construction of M. Thus we have
64 > 6J.
Below we distinguish three exhaustive sub-cases.
Sub-case 2.1. a' =/ i.
In this sub-case, we also have a 74 i, because v < ti. Accordingly, P =
-J and P = - , and thus ui(ti, (si, s'.)) = 6% and ui(ti, (s', s')) = 34.
Therefore ui(ti, (si, s'_)) < ui(ti, (s', s')) as desired.
Sub-case 2.2. a' = i and a = i.
In this sub-case, we have P' = max{j, maxjog vj}-6 and P = max{}, maxjyj vj}-
o%. Because 34 > J , we further have P > Pj', which implies ui (ti, (si, s'_)) =
ti - Pi < t2 - P = ui(ti, (s', s')) as desired.
Sub-case 2.3. a' = i and a 74 i.
In this sub-case, we have Pi' = max{j, maxjoi vj} - 64, P = -6J, and t>
maxjoi vj. As t > 1 by hypothesis, we further have t2 ;> max{ , maxjyg oi}.
Accordingly, ui(ti, (si, s'_)) = -P = 6 < 6 (ti - max{ j, maxygi vj}) +
64 = ti - = ui(ti, (s', s')) as desired.
In sum, ui(ti, (si, s'_)) < ui(ti, (s', s')) for any s', and si is strictly ti-S-dominated
by s', contradicting the fact that si E S(ti). Therefore Claim 1 holds. Eli
CLAIM 2. V player i and V type ti E {1, ... , V} of i, if si = (1, ti) then si V S(ti).
PROOF OF CLAIM 2. By definition, it suffices for us to show that si is strictly ti-
S-dominated by strategy s' = (0, ti). For this purpose, arbitrarily fixing a strategy
subprofile s'_ of -i, it suffices to show that
ui (ti, (si, s'_ )) < ui (ti, (s', s'g)).
To do so, first notice that M does not halt in Step b in either the play of (si, s'_j) or
the play of (s', s'), because t2 > 1 by hypothesis. The analysis below is very similar
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to Case 2 of Claim 1. Indeed, in the plays of (si, s'_i) and (s', s') respectively, we
denote by og and o$ the rewards that player i receives in Step e, and by (a, P) and
(a', P') the final outcomes. Letting s = (e , v) for each player j f i, we have
E ti 1t e t-(5'=- + V2>- * =o
* 4n [1+ ti 1+ 4n 1+tj
and we distinguish three cases as before:
" If a' =L i, then a $ i as well, and we have
ui(ti, (si, s'_)) = -= o <$ = -Pj' = u (ti, (s', s')).
" If a'= i and a = i, then
1 1
Pi = max{-, max } - og > max{-, max v } - P,2' j#i 2 ,is
and we have
ui(ti, (si, s'_)) = ti - Pi < ti - PFl = u (ti, (s', s'_)).
" Otherwise, we have that a'= i and a / i, which implies
1
ui(ti, (si, s'_)) = -Pi = Ji < 6$ < (ti-max{-, max v })+6 = t -Pi, = u (ti, (s', s')).2 j#i
In sum, si is strictly ti-S-dominated by s', and Claim 2 holds.
CLAIM 3. V player i, if si is conservatively strictly rational in game (C, M), then
vi smpi.
PROOF OF CLAIM 3. Assume for sake of contradiction that si is conservatively
strictly rational and vi < smpi. By definition we have si E S(6h), and thus by Claim
1 we have
vi ! 64. (6.2)
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Let s' = (1, smpj). In order to reach a contradiction it suffices for us to prove the
following statement:
Vt E 9i, Vs'_- e S(t-j), ui(6, (si, s'_i)) < ui(0j, (si, sl_)). (6.3)
To see why this is sufficient, notice that if s' E S(64) then by definition Statement 6.3
implies that si is conservatively strictly dominated by s', contradicting the hypothesis
that si is conservatively strictly rational. If s' V S(O6), then by definition there exists
a strategy oi E A(Sj) such that
Vs'_j E S-j, Ui (0j, (s', s'g)) < Ui (0j, (ui, s'_;))
In other words, s' is strictly dominated by ai in game (C, M). Because S(9j) is the set
of strategies that are not strictly dominated in game (C, M), by well know properties
of strict dominance we have that there exists a strategy o E A(S( 2 )) such that s' is
strictly dominated by ou in game (C, M), that is, the following statement holds:
Vs'_, E S-i, ui(O, (s', s'_)) < ui(0j, (oj, s'_)). (6.4)
Because S(t-j) c Sj for each t E 9, Statements 6.3 and 6.4 together imply that
Vt E 4, Vs'_; E S(tj) , u;(6j, (si, s';)) < (0j, (or, s';),
which by definition implies that si is conservatively strictly dominated by o", again
contradicting the hypothesis that si is conservatively strictly rational.
Below we shall prove Statement 6.3. Arbitrarily fixing a type profile t E 9i and
a strategy subprofile s'_ E S(t-j), it suffices to show
To do so, let *(t) = argmaxj tj with ties broken lexicographically. Because t E M;
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and smpi = mintgE1 maxy ti, we have
t*(t) > smpi.
Let s= (e7, vj) for each j $ i. Because s'(t) E S(t,(t)), by Claim 1 we have that
Accordingly, the following sequence of inequalities holds:
V'(t) ; t*(t) > smpi > V> 0 Oi > 0, (6.5)
where the third inequality holds by hypothesis, and the fourth is just Equation 6.2.
By Sequence 6.5 we have v'(t) > 0, thus M does not halt in Step b in the play of
(si, s'_) or in the play of (s', s'_). Below we consider the outcomes of the two plays.
Let (a, P) and (a', P') be the final outcomes of (si, s'_) and (s', s') respectively.
By Sequence 6.5 we have v'(t > vi, thus *(t) / i. If v'gt > smpi, then by the
construction of M we have that (e'y, v'(t)) is ordered before (1, smpi), and thus is
also ordered before (es, vi). If v'gt = smpi, then by Sequence 6.5 we have v'= t(t.
Also by Sequence 6.5 we have t*(t) > 1. Thus by Claim 2 we have e' = 0, which
implies that (e'ly, v'/t) is ordered before (1, smpi), and thus is also ordered before
(ei, vi). Accordingly, no matter what v'(t) is, we always have
a 4 i and a' $ i,
therefore the utilities of player i only depend on his rewards in Step e in both plays.
Let og and 6i be the rewards that player i receives in Step e, in the plays of (8i, s'_)
and (s', s'i) respectively. We have
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E smpi E v 1 el E smpi - vi 1 e
smp -- +-61±- 24n 1 +smpi 4n1 + vi (1 + V)2 4n (1 + smpi) (1 + vi) (1 + V)2
E [ 1 14n (1+ smp,)(1+ v,) (1 +V)2
> E[ 1 - !> = 0
4n (1 + smp)2 (1+ V)2 ~ 4n (1 + V) 2  (1 + V)2J
where the first inequality holds because vi < smpi and ej > 0, the second because
vi < smpi, and the last because smpi < V. Accordingly we have
J5$ > Ji,
which implies
ui(Oi, (si, s'_)) = 6 < 3$ = u (G2 , (s', s'))
as we wanted to show. Therefore Claim 3 holds. FI
Now we are ready to prove that if s is conservatively strictly rational then Inequal-
ity 6.1 holds, which implies Theorem 3. Because s is conservatively strictly rational,
by Claim 3 we have that
vi ; smpi for each i. (6.6)
If M halts in Step b, then vi = 0 for each i, which together with Equation 6.6
implies that smpi = 0 for each i, and thus 2"d(66) = 0. Accordingly,
REV(M(s)) = 0 = 2 "nd(_q) > 2"d( ) - E.
Otherwise, by Equation 6.6 we have that the second highest value in {vi, .. , vn}
is greater than or equal to the second highest value in {smp1,. . . , smpn}, which is
precisely 2 nd(2). By the construction of M we have that for each og in Step e,
E vi 1 j E E
og =2 < - 1+1)=-4n 11 + vi (1 + V)2] 4n 2n
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Letting (a, P) be the outcome of s, we have: (1) Pa = max{ j, maxga jo} - 6a, (2)
Vi / a, P = -6J, and (3) maxjya v3 is the second highest value in {vi, ... , on}, which
implies max{ 1, maxj$a v } ; 2 n(2). Accordingly,
22
R EV(M(s)) = Pa + E Pi >! 2"nd(2) - 6a - i6 > 2"nd(_) - n- > 2"nd(.q) -
iga iga 2
Therefore Theorem 3 holds. E
Remark. If a player's belief is not correct, then according to mechanism M his
utility may be negative and he may be "shocked" when seeing the final outcome. But
when the game is played he believes that his utility will be non-negative and thus
behaves as specified by our solution concept, in particular by Claim 3.
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Chapter 7
Three Concerns About The
Second-Belief Mechanism "in
Practice"
A concern raised about the second-belief mechanism is that "E rewards" may not be
enough motivation for the players to participate. When the relevant players opt to
"stay at home", the second-belief benchmark cannot be guaranteed, and thus the
second-price mechanism might in practice generate higher revenue.
Let us have a closer look. First, it should be appreciated that any rational player
prefers a positive utility, no matter how small, to 0 utility, which is the utility he would
receive if he opted out of the auction, both in the second-belief and the second-price
mechanism. (Saying otherwise requires an alternative notion of rationality.1 ) Second,
as we have already observed, conservative beliefs are implicit in any context, whether
or not a designer tries to leverage them. Accordingly, to compare properly the second-
belief and the second-price mechanism, one should consider the same, underlying,
'To be sure, such alternative notions exist: in particular, e-Nash equilibrium. Note however
that any mechanism which, like ours, achieves a revenue benchmark -at least in some contexts-
close to the highest true valuation, must rely on the traditional notion of rationality, instead of any
-alternative. This is so because, when the revenue benchmark equals the highest valuation minus E,
by definition the sum of the players' utilities must be at most e. Therefore any -alternative notion
of rationality will make the players indifferent between participating and opting out. And when
players opt out, the mechanism cannot guarantee its desired benchmark.
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conservative belief profile 4. Consider a player i who does not believe that his
valuation is the highest. Then i concludes that he will receive "e utility" under
the second-belief mechanism, and 0 utility under the second-price one. Therefore,
according to any reasonable (traditional or not) notion of rationality, if i chooses to
opt out in the second-belief mechanism, he should also opt out in the second-price
mechanism. In neither mechanism, therefore, can player i be relied upon to achieve
the corresponding revenue benchmark. Consider now a player i who believes that
he might be the one with the highest valuation. Then, in either mechanism, it is
dominant for him to participate in the auction. (In particular, in the second-belief
mechanism, opting out is strictly dominated by (0,6j), which always has positive
utility.) Accordingly, if i chooses to participate the second-price mechanism, he should
also participate the second-belief one.
Another (related) concern was raised for the case in which the players only have
very unprecise external beliefs. In this case, while the revenue generated by the
second-price mechanism is equal to the second-highest valuation, 2 nd(O), the one gen-
erated by the second-belief mechanism is "2"d(0) - E." Again, such a concern is based
on an "unfair" comparison. The second-belief mechanism works no matter what be-
liefs the seller may have about the quality of the players' conservative beliefs, and
insists on guaranteeing strictly positive utilities to the players (when they play conser-
vatively and not all players have value 0). By contrast, the second-price mechanism
only guarantees that the players' utilities are > 0, and thus cannot guarantee the
participation of players who believe that they do not have the highest valuation. Ac-
cordingly, for the seller to gain an extra e in revenue by adopting the second-price
mechanism instead of the second-belief one, it is necessary that he has enough in-
formation about the players: namely, he must be sure that each player believes that
he might be the one with the highest valuation. In absence of this information, to
guarantee the participation of all players, the second-price mechanism must be mod-
ified so as to provide some form of "e rewards" as well, and thus will miss its target
revenue in its purest form. To be sure, the second-price mechanism can be perturbed
so that all players with non-zero valuations get strictly positive utilities and it is
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strictly dominant for them to participate. But then the revenue of the seller becomes
"2nd(0) - E" as well.
A third concern raised is that the second-belief mechanism may miss its benchmark
because its players may prefer decreasing their opponents' utilities to increasing their
own ones. Indeed, if (1) the player with the highest valuation is player i, (2) i believes
that he is the player with the highest valuation, (3) i believes that 64 ;> 2 nd(g), and
(4) i further believes that 2 nd(g) > 2 "d(0), then, when all other players act rationally,
by sufficiently underbidding his own valuation -e.g., by bidding (0, 0)- player i will
cause another player to receive negative utility. However, let us emphasize that,
while leveraging the players' external beliefs, we continue to use the classical utility
function for single-good auctions: namely, the utility of every player equals his true
valuation minus the price he pays if he wins the good, and 0 minus the price he
pays otherwise. Under such a classical utility function, the second-belief mechanism
achieves its benchmark at every rational play. The concern about a player having a
different type of preference is therefore out of the model.
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Chapter 8
Future Directions
We believe that much work can be done in leveraging the players' set-theoretic beliefs.
Indeed, in a very recent work with Rafael Pass, we exhibit mechanisms that guar-
antee even higher revenue benchmarks (based on the players' set-theoretic higher-
order beliefs), under different solution concepts.
Beyond single-good auctions, we plan to investigate what social choice correspon-
dences can be implemented by leveraging the players' set-theoretic beliefs in other
strategic settings.
Finally, we should investigate models where some of the players' beliefs are set-
theoretic, and some are probabilistic, but without assuming the correctness of such
beliefs, let alone their being common knowledge.
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Appendix A
Extra Fragility of Implementation
at Some Ex-Post/Very Weakly
Dominant Equilibria
The notion of ex-post equilibrium, originally defined for Bayesian settings, is naturally
extended to our set-theoretic setting.
Definition 8. Given a class of contexts W and a mechanism M, an ex-post equi-
librium s is a profile of functions, where each si maps player i's conservative beliefs
to his (possibly mixed) strategies, such that: V context C E W, denoting by ., the
belief profile of C and by s(q) the strategy profile (s1(21),..., s(2)), s(9) is a
Nash equilibrium of the game (C, M).
If the range of each si only consists of pure strategies, then we say that s is a
pure ex-post equilibrium.
Note that ex-post equilibrium and very weakly dominant equilibrium are different
notions. 1
Definition 9. A mechanism M implements at some ex-post equilibrium a
social choice correspondence F for a class of contexts W if, ] an ex-post equilibrium
'If for each player i and each strategy si there exists 2R such that si (Rj) = si, then for each 9
the strategy profile s(.R) is also a very weakly dominant equilibrium. But otherwise not.
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s such that, V context C E W, denoting by 6 the belief profile of C, we have that
M(s(-4)) E F(-q).
If s is the ex-post equilibrium required above, then we further say that M imple-
ments F at s.
Definition 10. A mechanism M implementing a social choice correspondence F at
some ex-post equilibrium for a class of contexts W is fragile if, V ex-post equilibrium
s at which M implements F, ] another ex-post equilibrium s' satisfying the following
two properties:
(1) 3 a player i and a conservative belief 24 of i such that s' and s differ only at
A ;2 and
(2) V context C = (n,Q,e,u,0',9') in W such that 9j = 9, we have that
M (s'(')) V F(q').
(The notion of implementation at some very weakly dominant equilibrium and the
corresponding notion of fragility are similarly defined.)
Theorem 4. Ve E (0, 1] and V V > 6/62, any reasonable deterministic mechanism
implementing 2 nd for 92V at some pure ex-post/very weakly dominant equilibrium is
fragile.
Theorem 5. VE E (., 1] and V V > [E-/21, any reasonable mechanism implementing
c2nd for -9 at some ex-post/very weakly dominant equilibrium is fragile.
We prove Theorems 4 and 5 for ex-post equilibrium only, as the proof for very
weakly dominant equilibrium is almost the same. (Notice that the lower-bound of V
in Theorem 4 depends on e2 rather than being linear in e as in the other impossibility
results. This is not a crucial difference, and is only because in the proof of Theorem
4 we require that player 2's true valuation is > 1, instead of > 0 as typically assumed
for auctions.)
2That is, si(2A) $ s'(2A); si(q ) = s'(. ) for all 2; $ A; and sj = s for all j # i.
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A.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Let f be a value in (0, 1], V an integer greater than 6/e 2, and M a reasonable deter-
ministic mechanism implementing E2"d for 9' at some pure ex-post equilibrium s.
Further, let
0 6 be a positive integer such that 36*/E 2 < V, and
e * = {(x, 6*) : z [3x0/E21.
Notice that the desired 0* exists because V > 6/e 2. Notice also that there exists some
context in -9 with player 2's conservative belief being 2*.
We prove that there exists another pure ex-post equilibrium s' such that:
(1) s and s' differ only at the conservative belief 92 of player 2; and
(2) for every context C = (n,V,0,2) E 9' with 22 = 92, REV(M(s'(9))) <
e2 nd (-q).
To do so, we analyze two (classes of) related games G and G'. Again to clarify the
game to which a given quantity refers, we shall use the superscripts G and G'.
G = (C, M), where C= (2, V, 0, ) is an arbitrary context in -92 with 22 = 2*.
In G we have that smp1  0 O1 and smP2 = [3*/E21. Because C has correct conserva-
tive beliefs, we have
01 > [360/e 21, 02 = 62, and E 1 .
Letting (a, P) = M(s(2)), we claim (and prove later) that the following (in)equalities
hold:
(g) 2 nd(g) 306/e2, REV(a, P) 36*/e, a = 1, 306/e < P1 5 01, and P2 < 0.
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G' (C', M), where C' = (2, V, 9', 9') with 9' = 0,
'= 1, and 2 = {(x, 0 2 ) X > f2[2/E1}.
Notice that C' E -2v. In G' we have that smp' > 0' > [39*/e2] and smp' = [2*/e].
Letting (a', P') = M(s(q')), we claim that the following (in)equalities hold:
(g') 2nd(2') 26/e, REV(a', P') 26*, a = 1, 2; P< 9', andP2 <0.
Let us explain why all 5 (in)equalities in (g) hold. The first follows because
2 "d( g) = smp2 . The second follows from our hypothesis of M and s. Now notice
that, because M satisfies the opt-out condition and s(s) is an equilibrium of G, we
have u G(a, P) 2 0 and UG (a, P) 2 0. Accordingly, because there is only a single good,
at most one player can pay a positive price. That is, the revenue must come from a
single player, and must be at least 36*/e. Because this player has to get non-negative
utility, he must be player 1, and must get the good. Thus the other (in)equalities of
(g) hold. The (in)equalities of (g') hold for similar reasons.
We construct the desired pure ex-post equilibrium s' as follows: s2(9*) = s2 (2),
and s' coincides with s everywhere else. By construction, for any context C" E -9
with conservative belief profile 9" such that 2' , s'q2 ") = s(q"), and thus
s'(9") is a Nash equilibrium of (C", M). Because context C is a generic context in
92V with player 2's conservative belief being 92, it remains for us to prove that s'
satisfies the following properties:
(A) s'(2) is a Nash equilibrium of G; and
(B) REV(M(s'(9))) < 36*/E.
Proof of Property A Because s' = si, to establish Property A, it suffices to show
that (s1(21), s2(2)) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
By construction, player l's true type is the same in C and C', and the same is
true for player 2's true type. Therefore we have that
S= u(-) and uG'(.) = UG(-).
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Accordingly, (s1(,1), s2(42)) is a Nash equilibrium of G if and only if it is a Nash
equilibrium of G'. Because, again by construction, player l's conservative belief is
the same in C and C', we further have
S1(4') = s ,
and thus
(S1(A), S'(-2)) = (S1(-'), s'(2*)) = (s1(', s2()) =s
Because s(2') is a Nash equilibrium of G', (s1(21), s'(V2)) is a Nash equilibrium of
G' and thus of G, and Property A holds. [Z
Proof of Property B Because s'(2) = (s1(91), s2(2)) = s(g'), to establish
Property B, it suffices to prove that
REV(M(s(-4'))) < 36*/e. (A.1)
Because the last inequality in (g') states that at the strategy profile s(9') the revenue
is at most the price paid by player 1, Pj, it actually suffices to show that
P11 < 30*/E. (A.2)
We prove Inequality A.2 by contradiction. Assume P' > 36*/e, and consider the
auxiliary game G".
G" = (C", M), where C" = (2, V, 0", q") with
0" = (F20/El,0 2), " = {(0", X) : (01, x) E A1},
and 2' = 2.
Notice that C" E 92V. In G" we have that smp' > smp' = [260/c]. Letting
(a", P") = M(s(9")), similar to what we have seen before, the following (in)equalities
hold:
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(g") 2 "d(7") > 26*/e, REV(a", P") >_ 26*, a" = 1, 26* P' 6" = [26 /el,
and P2' 0.
Let us now prove that, in game G', player 1 can profitably deviate from the
equilibrium s(g') by playing s1 (9') instead of si (9'). Indeed, 2' = 2q implies that
s2(2') = s2(9'), and thus M(s1(''), s2(2)) = M(s(9")) = (a", P"). According
to (g"), in the outcome (a", P") player 1 still wins the good, but pays < F26*/e]
rather than > 36*/E.
Because 06 is an integer > 1, we have that 30*/e - 260/e > 1. Therefore 36O/E >
F29/e], implying that player 1 can indeed benefit by deviating from s1 (9') to s1 (-'1)
in equilibrium s(g'). Thus, assuming that Inequality A.2 is false contradicts the fact
that s(g') in an equilibrium of G'. The contradiction establishes Inequality A.1 and
thus Property B. Fli
Therefore Theorem 4 holds. U
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Let E be a value in (1/2, 1], V an integer greater than [e- 2], and M a reasonable
mechanism implementing e2"d for -9" at some ex-post equilibrium s. To prove that
M is fragile, let H be an integer such that
V>H> 1
-- > e - 1/2
Similar to previous proofs, we are going to consider different contexts and thus dif-
ferent games, and we use superscripts to clarify the game to which a given quantity
refers.
Let 92 = {(H, 0)}. Notice that there exist some contexts in @92 with player
2's conservative belief being 9i -indeed, these are contexts where player l's true
valuation is H, player 2's true valuation is 0, and player 2 believes that player l's true
valuation is H (that is, player l's external belief are the only undetermined part).
Our goal is to show that there exists another ex-post equilibrium s' such that:
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(1) s' and s differ only at the conservative belief 92 of player 2; and
(2) for every context C = (n, V, 0, 2) c -2V with 22 = M2, REV(M(s'(,))) <
To do so, we analyze two (classes of) related games, G and G', as follows.
G = (C, M), where C = (2, V, 0, -) is an arbitrary context in -9 with -2 = q2.
In G we have that 9 = (H, 0), 9 E 91, smp1 = smp 2 = H, and thus 2 "d(M) = H no
matter what 21 is.
G= (C', M), where C' = (2, V, ', M') with
9' = (1, 0), 1 = {(1, x) (H, X) E q1}, and 2 =
{(x, 0) : x > 1}.
Notice that C' E 92 and 2 nd(') L.
Let us now analyze game G'. Let w' = M(s(g')), and p' and EPj' respectively be
the probability that player i gets the good and the expected price that player i pays
according to w'. By the opt-out condition and our hypothesis, we have
u G(w') = p' - EPj 2 0, u G(w') = -EP' > 0, and EP, +EP 2 fe'(d') - .0, = 2-
Combining these three inequalities, we have
p > EP' e- EP2 e. (A.3)
We construct the desired ex-post equilibrium s' as follows:
s'2(-2*) = s2(-2),
and s' coincides with s everywhere else. By construction, for any context C" E -9
with conservative belief profile 9" such that 2' 7 , s'(2 ") = s( "), and thus
61
s'(q") is a Nash equilibrium of the game (C", M). Because C is a generic context
in 92V with player 2's conservative belief being ,2, it remains for us to prove that s'
satisfies the following properties:
(A) s'(-4) is a Nash equilibrium of C; and
(B) REV(M(s'(9))) < cH.
Proof of Property A. We do so by introducing another (auxiliary) game G".
G"/= (C",M), where C" = (2, V,6",4") with 0"= 9, " = 1, and 62 =
Notice that C" E -9, and that C" differs from C only at player 2's belief and from
C' only at player 1's true valuation (of course 'i has to be consistent with '' which
is H, and thus differs from -'i, but player l's external belief does not change).
Because s' = si, 92 = -2, I1 = 2'', s2(92) = 32(2), and 62 = 62', we have
s'() =(s'(A1), s '(42)) = (S1 (A), s'2(-2*))
= (s1('1), s2( 2 )) = (s1('1'), s2(-4')) = s(.
Because s(R") is a Nash equilibrium of G" by the definition of s, s'(.) is also a Nash
equilibrium of G". Because G and G" have the same true valuation profile, s'(2) is
a Nash equilibrium of G, and Property A holds.
Proof of Property B. Notice that in game G,
G(M(s(_q'))) = u'(w') = p'H - EP' > p'H - p' > e(H - 1),
where the inequalities hold by Equation A.3.
Because s'(V) = (s1(91), S'2(-2)) = (sI(A1), s2(2)) is a Nash equilibrium of G,
we have
uG(M(s 1(2 1), s2(q2 ))) uG(M(s(_q'))) c(H - 1)
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and
uf(M(s1(21), s2(_2))) u'(M(s1(A), out2)) = 0.
Let w" = M(s1(A1), S2(62)), and p' and EP" respectively be the probability that
player i gets the good and the expected price that player i pays according to w".
Combining with the above two lines of equations, we have
uG(w") = p"H - EP,' > e(H - 1) and u'(w") = -EP> > 0.
Combining with the facts that 0 < p" < 1, 1/2 < E < 1, and H > 1 we have
REV(M(s'(4))) = REV(M(s1(4 1 ), s2(-2)))
= EP1' + EP2' EP" p''H - E(H - 1) = H(p'' - + )
H
SH(1 -ce+ g)< H(1 - c + iE - 1/2) = H/2 <,eH.
Therefore Property B holds, and so does Theorem 5. N
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